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The Origins of Judicial Review:
A Historian's Explanation
Charles F. Hobson*
We are indebted to Professor Wood for a characteristically stimulating
lecture.' He has a gift for making history an intellectually exciting enterprise
and a knack for drawing readers in and inviting us to join him on a voyage of
discovery. He flatters his readers by making us feel smarter and more knowl-
edgeable than we really are. He encourages the vain notion that we are equal
partners in the quest for historical knowledge, participating with him in
reading the sources, connecting disparate phenomena, and drawing certain
inferences from the accumulated evidence. The logic and lucidity of his argu-
ment enable us to perceive the conclusion even before he formally announces
it. We then feel as if we, not the author, have made the critical deduction and
as if he is merely seconding our prior discovery. The extent to which Wood
creates this illusion of the reader's "smartness" is a measure of his superb
craftsmanship as a writer.
In this lecture, as in all his writings, Wood is the consummate historian,
wholly dedicated to the principles and values of a discipline that in its grand-
est aspirations seeks not merely to accumulate knowledge about the past but
to promote "historical-mindedness" as a kind of epistemology, a way of
understanding reality. Practically every word Wood writes defines what it
means to be historically minded, a habit of mind that he acquired as a student
of Bernard Bailyn. No one has done more than Bailyn and Wood to educate
their fellow historians and the general reading public in developing a sophisti-
cated, historical cast of mind.2
* Editor, volumes 5-9 TH PAPERS OF JOHN MARsHALT, sponsored by The College of
Wiflliam and Mary and The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture. Vol-
ume 10 TBEPAPsOFJONMsHAu.: CORRESPONDENcEPAPERS,ANDSELECTEDJuDICLAL
OPINIONS, JANUARY 1824-MARCH 1827 is forthcoming from the University of North Carolina
Press in the spring of 2000. The author presented this speech as a commentary to Gordon
Wood's Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture, delivered on October 9, 1998, at the Washing-
ton and Lee University School of Law.
1. See generally Gordon S. Wood, Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, 56 WAsa &
LEE L. REV. 787 (1999).
2. See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Creative Imagination ofBernardBailyn, in THE
TRANSFORMATIONOFEARLYAMEECANHISTORY SOCMTYAUTHORrrY,ANDIDEOLOGY 16-50
(James A. Henretta et al. eds., 1991).
56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 811 (1999)
In revisiting the origins of judicial review, Wood has admirably per-
forined the historian's job of clearing away a pervasive anachronism that has
characterized much of the scholarship on judicial review and on the Marshall
Court in general. We put too much emphasis on one celebrated case, Marbury
v. Madison,3 as the defining moment when the Supreme Court acquired the
authority to strike down legislation as contrary to the Constitution. Further,
we tend to regard the Marshall Court's practice of declaring laws unconstitu-
tional as prefiguring the modem doctrine ofjudicial review, a practice where-
by the Supreme Court exercises sweeping authority to decide the divisive
political, social, and economic questions that dominate our public life. And
we are too inclined to credit Chief Justice Marshall in his great nationalizing
decisions as anticipating, if not actually creating, the regulatory nation-state
that the United States has become.
I am in such complete agreement with Professor Wood that I am hard-
pressed to offer a comment that goes beyond an affirming nod. My remarks
accordingly will focus on the way a master historian goes about answering the
perennially fascinating question of the origins and nature of judicial review.
The traditional account, where it has gone beyond Marbury, has mainly con-
sisted of collecting the so-called "precedents" of the 1780s and 1790s, along
with quotations from the founders, such as Alexander Hamilton's famous No.
78 of The Federalist.4 Such evidence, while illuminating, is for Wood wholly
unsatisfactory to explain "something as significant and forbidding as judicial
review."'5 He proceeds on the sound assumption that the sources of judicial
review "had to flow from fundamental changes taking place in the Americans'
ideas of government and law."6 In other words, what we have been accus-
tomed to regard as causes or sources are in fact symptoms or effects of deeper
underlying currents.
Wood then identifies four fundamental alterations in people's thinking
about government and law: (1) the redefinition of the "separation of powers,"
by which judges gained a kind of equivalent status with legislators and execu-
tives as representatives or agents of the sovereign people; (2) the embodiment
of fundamental law in written constitutions; (3) the "legalization" of funda-
mental law, the process that "domesticated" the Constiution so that it could
run in the court system just like any ordinary law; and (4) the separation of
law and politics.! I have not discerned any hierarchy of causes in this discus-
sion, that is, any indication that Wood regards one as more important than
3. 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
4. TBE FEDERAIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
5. Wood, supra note 1, at 793.
6. Id.
7. See generally id. at 792-808 (discussing these principles).
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another; however, he does allow that the first, the redefinition of the separa-
tion of powers, is "perhaps the most crucial."' The more important point for
Wood is that none of these causes was sufficient in itself to account for the
emergence of judicial review. The coalescence of these various elements
produced this result; each was necessary but none was sufficient. As one
would expect in a historical explanation, Wood adheres to a basic chronologi-
cal order of presentation, although to be sure these developments overlapped.
The legalization of fundamental law and the separation of law and politics
were culminating points that occurred in the Marshall Court period.9
At no point does Wood contend that judicial review was inevitable, that
it had to happen. On the contrary, he expresses wonder and amazement at the
emergence ofjudicial review, almost as if it were a miracle: phrases such as
"remarkable transformation"10 and "momentous transformation" reflect the
capacity for surprise that should be second nature to the historian.' 2 Wood
resists the whiggish tendency to look at the past merely as an anticipation of
our present, as if our ideas, institutions, and social forms were the product of
the conscious intentions of our forebears. By assuming that the past is not
simply the present writ small 3 but a strange and different place, he is able to
make us see that judicial review was an extraordinary development that no
one could have predicted.
The proper starting point for an inquiry into the origins ofjudicial review
is the colonial period. Under the colonial regime, judges were an extension
of royal authority, completely identified with the royal governors. The admin-
istration of justice was part of the executive power, and "separation of pow-
ers" meant the separation of legislative and executive power. The populace
regarded judges with mistrust both because of their connection with the gov-
ernors and because oftheir exercise of broad discretionary power in interpret-
ing the multiple and confusing sources of colonial law. Against this back-
ground the historian must somehow explain that phenomenon known as "the
rise of an independent judiciary" - how the judicial power carved out a sep-
arate identity as one of the three constitutional powers of government, how
judges acquired their roles as the exclusive interpreters of the laws and as the
guardians ofthe rights of individuals in republican government, and ultimately
how unelected judges presumed to disallow laws that popularly elected legis-
latures had enacted. The emergence of judicial review was not the result of
8. Id. at 793.
9. Id. at 801-08.
10. Id. at 793.
11. Id. at802.
12. Id. at 793 (noting surprise at birth ofjudicial review).
13. See id. at 785 (discussing approaches to historical analysis).
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a deliberate design but of a series of gradual and halting steps that Wood has
succinctly summarized elsewhere:
[The initial identification offundamental law with a written constitution,
followed by the need to compare this written constitution with other laws,
then the lodging in the judiciary of the power of determining which law
was superior, which in turn led to the blurring of constitutional and ordi-
nary law in the regular court system that resulted finally inthe legal inter-
pretation of fundamental law in accord with what Hamilton... called the
"usual and established rules of construction" applied to statutory and other
ordinary law.'
4
Wood has produced the most elegant and intellectually satisfying account
we have of the origins of judicial review. Particularly impressive is the way
in which he identifies and explicates the several sources and then shows how
they flow together to form the entity that we call judicial review. The struc-
ture of the essay artfully conveys a sense of cumulative build-up in which the
shape and substance of judicial review becomes progressively clearer with
each successive source of illumination. Ultimately, Wood links the particular
story ofjudicial review with the grand theme of his life's work as a historian:
"the democratization of early America.""5
Over the years Wood has perfected and refined his account of the origins
ofjudicial review by integrating his own prodigious knowledge of the sources
of early America with the research and insights of other scholars whom he
generously acknowledges. In this latest version, the emergence of judicial
review appears more explicitly as a by-product of a broader historical process
that was occurring on both sides of the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. We
now have a clearer understanding that the growing prestige of the judiciary
was a reaction to the tremendous upsurge in legislation taking place in Great
Britain and in America, particularly after the onset of the Revolution. No
longer simply checks on an aggrandizing executive, representative assemblies
had become institutions whose chief activity was the enactment of positive
legislation to meet the demands of a modernizing society. 6 In England, the
swelling parliamentary statute book produced a sustained critique of legisla-
tion riddled with gross defects and inconsistencies and brought about a cor-
responding new respect for judicial interpretation as a means of rationalizing
and reconciling legislation to accord with the principles of the common law
14. Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the Founding, in Is THE SUPPt1dn
COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTrUTION? 153,164-65 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993).
15. GORDoN S. WOOD, THERADICAUSM OF THE AMECAN RVOLUTION ix (1992).
16. See Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1054-56 (1997) (explaining that most legislation addressed local activi-
ties).
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and equity. 7 Even in a system that recognized the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, there was plenty of room for a robust conception of judicial
power, as evidenced by Blackstone in his Commentaries and Lord Mansfield
as chiefjudge of the Court of King's Bench. 8
The same forces were at work in post-Revolutionary America where they
produced a similar critique of legislation, none more perceptive than that by
James Madison.19 Madison recognized more quickly than anyone else that the
turbulent, faction-ridden, interested politics that characterized the state legisla-
tures was ill-suited to the task of making good laws. Instead, the assemblies
enacted a profusion of ill-digested, inaccurate, confusing, and, even worse,
unjust laws that threatened the whole experiment in republican government.
Madison understood the principal problem of reform to be the checking of
legislative power, which he regarded as more than an overmatch for the
executive and judicial powers combined.2" In The Federalist No. 48, Madison
wrote: "The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."21 Madison, of
course, never conceived of and never fully endorsed the concept of judicial
review, but he did envision an enlarged role for the judiciary in helping to
ensure that popular government would also be stable and just. He preferred
to have wise and good laws framed at the outset by associating the judiciary
with the executive as a "council of revision" over pending legislation.' In this
way the judiciary would give the legislature "valuable assistance... in pre-
serving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity [and] technical propriety in the
laws"123 and would provide "an additional checek" against "unwise [and] unjust"
legislation.24
But the emerging trend toward separating law and politics worked against
acceptance of the revisionary power. Instead of prior revision of legislation,
17. SeeDAviDLEBRMAN, TIPROvINcEOFIEGisLATIoNDERMINED: LEGALTmORY
IN EIGHTErET-CENTRY BRITAIN 13-19 (1989) (explaining judiciary's reaction to increased
legislative activity of Parliament).
18. See id. at 31-67, 71-73 (discussing influence of Blackstone and of Mansfield).
19. See Rakove, supra note 16, at 1051-60 (explaining role of legislation during Revolu-
tionary era and Madison's arguments in support of Council of Revision as proposed in his
Virginia Plan of 1787).
20. See James Madison, Saturday July 21 in Convention, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 73, 74 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) (referring to legislative branch
as "overmatch" for executive and judicial branches).
21. THE FEDERAIWST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22. See Madison, supra note 20, at 74 (recording Madison's agreement that judiciary
should share revisionary power with executive).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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subsequent judicial review of statutes developed, extending the traditional
function of statutory construction to include the interpretation and enforce-
ment of written constitutions. From an Atlantic perspective, judicial review
can be seen as an American variation on the theme ofthe enhanced interpreta-
tive power ofjudges. Even without judicial review, it is clear that American
judges, like their English counterparts, would play a significant role in con-
trolling legislative excesses and abuses simply by exercising their ordinary
adjudicative power.
That American judges were able to go further and to construe constitu-
tions just like any ordinary law was the enduring achievement of Chief Justice
Marshall and his court. Wood thus essentially leaves intact the traditional
view that Marshall played the pivotal role in establishing judicial review. At
the same time, Wood provides an enriched historical context that yields the
most satisfactory explanation to date of the nature and significance of that
achievement. Marshall, of course, did not invent judicial review, but he was
largely responsible for carrying it beyond its original conception as an extraor-
dinary, rarely invoked judicial defense of fundamental law toward the modem
notion ofjudicial exposition of the constitutional text. He possessed a shrewd
sense of the possibilities and limits of judicial power. He understood that if
judicial review was to become a regular and continuously operating principle
ofthe American constitutional system, judges would somehow have to accom-
modate it as much as possible to the familiar judicial task of construing ordi-
nary law. Through his efforts to legalize the Constitution and to separate the
spheres of law and politics, Marshall did as much as anyone to establish the
peculiar American practice of judicial review.
Indeed, as Wood says, "[L]egalizing the Constitution was surely the most
important and requisite initial step in making possible judicial review, includ-
ing modem judicial activism."' This, of course, does not mean that Marshall
divined the future role of the Supreme Court, that he presciently grasped the
full implications of what he and his brethren were doing. To the extent that
he nudged history in a particular direction, Marshall did so without conscious
intention and without trying to anticipate the future. Rather, he looked to the
past to the settlement of 1787-88 for the meaning and intention of the Consti-
tution andto the great tradition of common law adjudication for the exposition
of that instrument. He could scarcely have imagined the expansive scope and
extent of the power that the Supreme Court wields today.
The Marshall Court was a far cry from today's Supreme Court. Only in
form does the modem Court resemble an ordinary court of law. It no longer
decides routine private lawsuits but by definition takes on only the weightiest
public causes, the decision of which involve the Court in policy-making in
25. Wood, supra note 1, at 802 n.75.
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ways scarcely distinguishable from legislating. The Fourteenth Amendment
and the subsequent application of the Bill of Rights to the states have trans-
formed the Constitution into a far more potent instrument for bringing contro-
versial political and social questions to the bar ofthe Supreme Court. By con-
trast, the Marshall Court remained essentially a legal institution, an appellate
court for deciding ordinary cases of common law and equity. Constitutional
adjudication remained an infrequent, if not an extraordinary exercise ofjudi-
cial power. To be sure, the Marshall Court had periodic bursts of activity, but
it was hardly "activist" in the modem sense. Most of the time it quietly
pursued its strictly legal business, far removed from the hurly-burly of poli-
tics. Of course, it was during these long periods of quiescence that the Court
solidified its institutional identity and authority in a way that conditioned
Americans to accept its role in making constitutional law as well.
This view of Marshall may not be the heroic image of the great Chief
Justice that late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century hagiographers
promoted,26 but it does conform to historical reality. Marshall was the benefi-
ciary of a historical process that allowed him to play a pivotal role in the
creation of American constitutional law. Another great jurist, one whose
devise made this lecture possible, made this point in his remarks commemo-
rating the centennial of Marshall's appointment as chiefjustice: "A great man
represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to vary the figure, a
strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his greatness consists
in his being there."27 Amid the swelling chorus of adulatory praise that was
bestowed on Marshall during the centennial, this comment may appear to be
iconoclastic and a trifle querulous. Yet in the same address Holmes went on
to afirm his belief 'that if American law were to be represented by a single
figure, sceptic and worshipper alike would agree without dispute that the
figure could be but one alone, and that one John Marshall."'t As we approach
the bicentennial of Marshall's appointment, Professor Wood has given us a
lecture that is true to the spirit of Holmes's centennial remarks.
26. See generally 1-3 JOHNMARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER, AND JUDICIALSEPVICES (John
F. Dillon ed., 1903); 1-4 ALBERT I. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JoHNIARsHALL (1916, 1919).
27. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIvER
WENDELL HOLMEs, AND FELIX RTER ON JOHq MARSIALL 129,131 (1967).
28. Id. at 133.

